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psychopathic traits are related 
to diminished guilt aversion and 
reduced trustworthiness during 
social decision-making
Xu Gong1,2,3,4, Inti A. Brazil4,5, Luke J. Chang  6 & Alan G. sanfey4,7
Individuals with high levels of psychopathic tendencies tend to show a lack of guilt, a lack of empathic 
concern, and a disregard for the impact of their decisions on others. However, how guilt influences 
social decision-making for those with high psychopathic traits is still unknown. Here, we investigated 
how psychopathic traits relate to the capacity to acquire knowledge about social expectations, and 
to what extent guilt aversion affects subsequent decision-making. 63 participants completed self-
report measures of psychopathy, and then played a modified Trust Game in the role of the Trustee. 
Results showed that participants’ self-reported beliefs about their partner’s expectations were largely 
predictive of the amount of money they returned to the partner. These decisions were negatively 
correlated with the PPI-I scores. Furthermore, participants’ degree of guilt aversion were negatively 
correlated with PPI total scores. Our findings suggest that individuals with higher psychopathic traits 
are indeed capable of understanding the expectations of others, but do not seem to directly utilise this 
knowledge in their social decision-making, and experience less anticipated guilt about this. The present 
study provides empirical evidence of intact social knowledge coupled with decreased reciprocity and 
diminished guilt aversion as levels of psychopathic traits increase.
Psychopathy is a personality construct characterized by impaired social-emotional processing combined with a 
tendency to display disruptive and antisocial behaviors1. The interpersonal-affective disturbances that lie at the 
core of this construct encompass a lack of empathy, guilt, and remorse2–4, and are considered to be unique to 
psychopathy. Psychopathy, with its distorted moral reasoning, transgressive actions, as well as deficits in social 
functioning, has been widely acknowledged as a risky social threat that leads to insecurity and unrest, arousing 
fear across society5. Moreover, disturbed behaviors associated with psychopathy are more broadly distributed in 
non-clinical populations with high psychopathic traits6–9. These traits can be measured using self-report ques-
tionnaires, such as the Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI)10 and the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale-Short 
form (SRP-SF)11. It is of vital importance for scientific investigations to better understand the psychological pro-
cesses and mechanisms underlying psychopathic behaviors in the general population, which can also then pro-
vide novel insight into the violent mind.
Psychopathy has repeatedly been linked to poor social decision-making, partly hypothesized as due to a 
diminished capability for making appropriate social inferences and for following social norms and rules12–14. For 
example, the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG), in which two players simultaneously and independently choose 
to either cooperate or defect based on reciprocal altruism or reciprocal exchange of favors, is typically used to 
measure cooperation. The optimal individual decision for a player in terms of pay-off is to always choose ‘defect’ 
as compared to ‘cooperate’, though this is considered a less prosocial choice. Previous studies have found that 
offenders with psychopathy showed deficits in reasoning about social rules during social exchange while being 
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asked to predict the opponent’s behavior before making their own decision in an iterated PDG15. In addition, 
higher levels of psychopathy have been associated with more selfish patterns of cooperation with others in both 
offenders and non-offenders9,16.
Altruistic punishment occurs when individuals punish social norm violators even when this behavior is 
costly for the punisher17 Research has revealed that individuals with higher psychopathic traits give greater pun-
ishment to other players who treat them unfairly as compared to individuals with lower psychopathic traits, 
and that these punishment decisions were positively correlated to self-reported emotional gratification scores 
rather than sympathy scores. A mediational analysis further revealed that the predictive effect of psychopa-
thy on emotional gratification was mediated by altruistic punishment, which suggested that the source of the 
punishment by the individuals with high psychopathic traits may lie in their own emotional gratification or 
satisfaction18. Furthermore, individuals with high psychopathic traits reduced their use of social advice during 
decision-making19. Together, these findings highlight different aspects of impaired social decision-making that 
have been associated with increasing levels of psychopathy. Understanding more about these impairments is 
essential, especially because they often lead to negative consequences for others13,19.
For optimal decision-making, choices made during social exchange require accurate predictions of the expec-
tations of one’s social partner. Yet, i) it is unclear to what extent individuals with elevated levels of psychopathy 
possess the capacity to make the social inferences required to undergo a mutually satisfactory exchange; ii) or, 
whether they do have the necessary knowledge of the expectations of their interaction partner, but are simply 
insensitive to this social knowledge. Hypothetical moral dilemmas scenarios have previously been used to assess 
willingness to harm others and reason about transgressions, in comparison to non-psychopathic samples20,21. For 
a particular moral dilemma scenario, on the one hand, people may feel the action is wrong; on the other hand, a 
cost-benefit analysis is calculated in which action can lead to a better outcome. For example, people usually report 
the reluctance to push a human down a footbridge to stop a trolley from running over five persons. The former 
is a direct ‘personal’ harm, which is associated with strong negative emotional responses, eliciting moral disap-
proval. The latter is an indirect ‘impersonal’ harm, which sacrifice one for preserving the welfare of a large num-
ber of other people, reflecting greater concern for a rational ‘utilitarian’ decision than the emotionally aversive 
means22,23. The utilitarian moral response pattern among individuals with high psychopathic traits may reflect a 
reduced influence of affective processes on decision-making that leads to lessened interest in the expectation and 
welfare of others, even when they are capable of acquiring social knowledge24–26. However, a recent study using 
these social dilemmas found no differences in utilitarian moral judgment between psychopaths and a control 
group27. Hence, hypothetical moral dilemma scenarios are a limited way to answer the controversial question of 
whether, and to what degree, psychopaths have restricted understanding of moral knowledge and expectations of 
others that are used to guide judgments and decisions.
Here, we employed a model of guilt aversion as assessed by a Trust Game paradigm (Fig. 1) in order to quantify 
our participants’ knowledge of the expectations of others, their guilt aversion, and their social decision-making. 
The guilt aversion model has shown that the anticipation of guilt may be one of the potential mechanisms that 
motivates cooperative behavior in many social settings28. This study found that beliefs about the expectations of 
others motivated reciprocal behavior, and that counterfactual guilt (defined as the amount of guilt individuals 
would have felt had they returned less money than they believed their partner expected) also promoted reciprocal 
behavior. According to this model, one’s aversion to the possibility of experiencing guilt in the future prompts 
reciprocal decisions in the present in order to minimize this anticipation of guilt, and this can be a powerful 
motivator in the decision-making process. Since guiltlessness is a key feature of psychopathy, it might well be 
expected that high levels of psychopathic traits relate to diminished guilt aversion, and that this may play a key 
role in the pattern of social decisions seen in psychopathy. The general goal of the present study was to system-
atically explore the relationship between psychopathic traits in a non-offender sample, the generation of social 
inferences, and guilt aversion during social decision-making. Firstly, we investigated whether the norm violations 
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Figure 1. The timeline of a single round of the modified Trust Game. (A) Each round begins with a fixation 
cross in the middle of the screen. (B) Facial pictures of Player 1 on that round. (C) Participants indicate their 
belief about Player 1’s investment. (D) The actual offer from Player 1. (E) Participants indicated their belief 
about what Player 1 had expected them to return. (F) Participants indicated the amount of money they actually 
wanted to return. (G) Payoff for both players revealed. (H) The real expectation of Player 1 on that round 
revealed.
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and socially inappropriate behavior typically seen in relation to increasing levels of psychopathy were associated 
with a reduced understanding of social norms and expectations, or rather whether understanding is intact but 
that these norms and expectations are taken less into account during decision-making. Given the absence of 
behavioral performance differences between individuals high and low in psychopathic traits in moral and social 
decision-making tasks27,29,30, we hypothesized that non-incarcerated individuals scoring relatively high on psy-
chopathy would be unimpaired in understanding others’expectations, but nevertheless would choose to ignore 
this social information when making reciprocal decisions19. Secondly, we examined the relationship between guilt 
aversion and reciprocity. Considering that individuals with high levels of psychopathic traits are more likely to 
engage in non-normative social behavior and express less guilt and concern about others’ emotions or welfare, 
we hypothesized that increasing levels of psychopathic traits should correspond to less guilt aversion and thus 
lessened reciprocal behavior during social decision-making. Importantly, there is evidence that the nature of 
the relationships between psychopathy and measures of cognitive functioning is highly dependent on the meas-
urement of psychopathy used31,32. Therefore, we employed two instruments, the PPI and the SRP-SF, which are 
widely used for measuring psychopathy-related traits in community samples (Table 1). The PPI was specifically 
designed to assess psychopathic personality traits among the non-clinical population, and discerns eight specific 
constituent traits(s) and provides a continuum measurement of each trait. In addition, the SRP-SF, derived from 
the PCL-R (Psychopathy Checklist-Revised)33, mainly used for estimating the maladaptive behaviors among the 
clinical psychopathic population, was also used as a supplemental measure. We hypothesized that the PPI scores 
may more sensitive and predictive when assessing psychopathy traits among nonforensic (e.g., community and 
students) samples as compared to the SRP-SF34.
Results
General results. On average across all trials, Player 1 invested 48.3% (SD = 28.7%) of their endowment 
(Fig. 2A), and their expectation (Player 1’s 1st order belief) was that Player 2 would return 39% of the total invest-
ment (SD = 17%) (Fig. 2B). Player 2 believed that Player 1 expected them to return on average 44% (SD = 17%) 
of the total investment (Fig. 2C). The average percentage of the total investment that Player 2 actually decided 
to return was 36% (SD = 18%) (Fig. 2D). Mixed-effects regression results indicated that participants in the role 
of Player 2 could accurately predict Player 1’s expectations (1st Order belief) (B = 0.70, SE = 0.02, t = 37.80, 
p < 0.001) (Fig. 3A). In addition, Player 2’s then appeared to use their predicted Player 1’s expectation (2nd Order 
Belief) to guide their decisions, in that they typically returned the amount of money that they believed Player 1 
expected them to return (B = 0.87, SE = 0.02, t = 42.02, p < 0.001) (Fig. 3B). Furthermore, participants reported 
that they would experience more counterfactual guilt if they had returned less money than they actually did 
(B = 0.23, SE = 0.02, t = 15.5, p < 0.001) (Fig. 3C). Taken together, these results replicate previous findings, sup-
porting the guilt aversion model28.
Correlation between psychopathy measures and behavioral performance. To examine the rela-
tionship between decision-making and variations in psychopathic traits, we computed the correlation coeffi-
cients, and corresponding bootstrapped confidence intervals, between participants’ PPI and SRP scores (total, 
as well as the two main factors) and participants’ behavioral responses in the Trust Game (Table 2). Significant 
Variable
Mean (SD)
All (63) Female (50) Male (13)
Age 22.14 (3.85) 21.68 (0.44) 23.92 (1.57)
Total PPI scoresa 335.25 (58.33) 332.26 (5.21) 376.23 (9.03)
PPI-I (or Fearless Dominance)a 126.38 (20.29) 124.38 (2.76) 134.08 (6.18)
PPI-II (or Antisocial impulsivity)a 167.70 (23.94) 162.28 (3.25)* 188.54 (3.98)*
Stress immunitya 26.22 (6.02) 25.72 (0.84) 28.15 (1.72)
Social potencya 59.03 (11.14) 58.54 (1.62) 60.92 (2.81)
Fearlessnessa 41.13 (8.49) 40.12 (1.07) 45.00 (3.00)
Cold-heartednessa 43.41 (8.22) 41.84 (1.06) 49.46 (2.29)
Blame externalisationa 33.63 (8.50) 32.44 (1.18) 38.23 (2.15)
Carefree non-planfulnessa 39.75 (6.07) 38.64 (0.84) 44.00 (1.26)
Machiavellian egocentricitya 58.56 (12.27) 56.60 (1.69) 66.08 (3.02)
Impulsive nonconformitya 35.76 (7.13) 34.60 (1.01) 40.23 (1.41)
Total SRP scoresb 47.08 (13.97) 43.52 (1.55) 60.77 (4.49)
SRP-F1b 23.46 (8.83) 21.18 (0.94)* 32.23 (2.99)*
SRP-F2b 23.62 (6.30) 22.34 (0.77) 28.54 (1.99)
SRP-Interpersonalb 12.30 (5.64) 11.24 (0.63)* 16.38 (2.11)*
SRP-Affectiveb 11.16 (3.84) 9.94 (0.41) 15.85 (0.98)
SRP-Lifestyleb 13.97 (4.25) 13.10 (0.55) 17.31 (1.12)
SPR-Antisocialb 9.65 (3.06) 9.24 (0.37) 11.23 (1.14)
Table 1. Mean PPI and SRP (scale and subscale) scores (n = 63) with corresponding standard deviations (SD). 
*Significant differences between Male and Female sample. aPPI10, bSRP-SF58.
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negative correlations were found between participants’ self-reported counterfactual guilt and their PPI total 
scores (r = −0.33), PPI Factor 1 scores (r = −0.25), and PPI Factor 2 scores (r = −0.29). This indicates that indi-
viduals who scored higher on psychopathic traits reported feeling less counterfactual guilt if they would have had 
returned less money to Player 1. Furthermore, individuals with higher scores on the PPI-I scales actually returned 
less money to Player 1 (PPI-I: r = −0.26). Moreover, the partial correlation analyses yielded non-significant 
results (see Supplement Table S1). Therefore, only PPI scores were used in subsequent analyses.
Correlations between computational parameters, behavior and PPI scores. We tested whether 
the guilt aversion model could predict participants’ decisions. Across all participants, the mean of the parameter 
θ12 was 0.43 (SD = 0.17, range = [0.13,0.91]) and the mean of ϕ was 19.59 (SD = 19.93, range = [4.47,104.11]). 
Next, bootstrapped Pearson correlations were computed between the two free parameters and the behavioral 
Figure 2. Descriptive statistics of the Behavioural Results. (A) Histogram of Player 1’s Investment across all 
trials (M = 48.3%, SD = 28.7%). (B) Histogram of the percentage of their investment (multiplied by 4) that 
Player 1 expects Player 2 to return (Player 1’s 1st Order Belief) (M = 39%, SD = 17%). (C) Histogram of the 
percentage of the transferred amount (multiplied by 4) that Player 2 believes Player 1 expects them to return 
(Player 2’s 2nd Order Belief) (M = 44%, SD = 17%). (D) The percentage of the transferred amount that Player 2 
decides to return (M = 36%, SD = 18%).
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responses, as well as PPI (total and factors) scores (see Table 3). A significant positive relationship was detected 
between the parameter θ12 and the amount of counterfactual guilt (r = 0.38) as well as between θ12 and the per-
centage of Total Amount actual returned (r = 0.72). This suggests that individuals who are more likely to report 
counterfactual guilt actually return more in the task, and also had higher guilt sensitivity parameter estimates. 
Furthermore, the parameter θ12 was significantly negatively correlated with the PPI total score (r = −0.28), indi-
cating that higher levels of psychopathic traits corresponded to reduced guilt sensitivity. For the parameter ϕ, we 
only found a significant positive relationship with the counterfactual guilt (r = 0.27).
Discussion
In this study, the role of guilt aversion during social decision-making in relation to psychopathic tendencies was 
studied in a non-clinical sample. The results indicated that elevated levels of psychopathic traits are not associated 
with a reduced understanding of social norms and expectations, but rather that these norms and expectations are 
taken less into account during social decision-making. Moreover, guilt aversion played a less prominent role in 
the decision-making process as the level of psychopathic tendencies increased.
Figure 3. Relationships between performance measures. (A) Player 1’s 1st Order Belief (E1S2) by Player 2’s 
2nd Order Belief (E2E1S2). (B) The amount returned by the Trustee (Player 2) (S2) by their 2nd Order Belief. 
(C) Player 2’s self-reported counterfactual guilt (the amount of guilt they would have felt had they returned 
less money) by the difference between their hypothetical choices from their actual behaviors. The dotted lines 
represent the participants’ best linear unbiased predictions (BLUPs).
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The findings demonstrated a negative association between guilt aversion and PPI total scores. Additionally, 
participants’ self-reported counterfactual guilt showed a negative relationship with the PPI total and factor scores. 
Finally, reciprocal behavior, indexed by the percentage of the total investment that participants actually returned, 
correlated negatively with participants’ PPI-I scores. These experimental findings support the hypothesis that 
individuals scoring higher on psychopathic personality traits do indeed possess accurate knowledge about others’ 
social expectations. However, the diminished reciprocal behavior shown by these individuals indicate that they 
are less likely to use this knowledge when making monetary decisions in a social context19, and that a reduced 
aversion to anticipated feelings of guilt plays a role in driving this tendency to disregard the expectations of others.
The relationship between the capacity for social inferencing, decision-making, and psychopathy has typically 
been studied in the context of moral reasoning. Many studies on this topic have employed hypothetical moral 
dilemmas to study how psychopathy might be related to judgments about the appropriateness of a given choice 
that affects others24,35. These studies provided initial indications that individuals with a high level of psychopathy 
may show more ‘utilitarian’ moral decisions. One explanation for these results could be that these individuals 
are not capable of properly incorporating social-affective information to guide their decisions36. However, other 
studies have found that having a high level of psychopathy is related to an intact capacity to discern right from 
wrong27,37, as well as an unaffected capacity to make social inferences such as those concerning the intentionality 
of others’ actions when making considerations about fairness38. Our results are in agreement with the latter body 
of findings, as they indicate that the capacity to generate beliefs about others’ expectations does not diminish as 
the level of psychopathic traits increases.
We also found that a high level of psychopathy is associated with less aversion to anticipated feelings of guilt 
when generating monetary choices based on social beliefs, in general agreement with previous findings. It has 
been proposed that it is the affective component of decision-making which is impaired in psychopathy rather 
than the cognitive component39.
Blair12 suggested the processing of social-affective information (e.g., sad or fearful facial expressions) sign-
aling when one’s own choices have detrimental outcomes for others is impaired in psychopathy, and that this 
impairment interferes with social and moral decision-making20,40. Indeed, some studies have found diminished 
physiological reactions to negative emotional stimuli (e.g., fearful and angry faces) among psychopathic offend-
ers during passive observation as compared to nonpsychopathic controls41,42. Other recent investigations have 
attempted to pinpoint how deficient processing of social-affective information translates to impaired social 
decision-making as a function of psychopathy level. For example, Marsh and Cardinale36 reported that psychop-
athy was associated with a reduced ability to recognize behaviors that cause fear in others, and moral trans-
gressions based on these behaviors were more likely to be rated as being acceptable. Another study found that 
increased utilitarian tendencies as the presence of psychopathic traits increases were partly driven by a reduced 
aversion to engaging in actions that are harmful to others43. Finally, Seara-Cardoso and colleagues44 discovered 
that the modulation of anticipation of guilt by the insula interacted with the interpersonal features of psychopa-
thy. Our finding that guilt aversion decreases as psychopathy scores increase is in agreement with the notion that 
impairments in the affective domain interfere with other cognitive operations subserving social decision-making. 
PPI SRP
Total Factor I Factor 2 Total Factor 1 Factor 2
CFGuilt −0.33** [−0.53, −0.10] −0.25* [−0.46, −0.02] −0.29* [−0.51, −0.04] −0.09 [−0.41, 0.24] −0.15 [−0.45, 0.18] −0.18 [−0.44, 0.13]
PredInvest (%) −0.08 [−0.33, 0.17] −0.13 [−0.34, 0.09] −0.01 [−0.27, 0.24] 0.11 [−0.15, 0.37] 0.03 [−0.20, 0.28] −0.03 [−0.25, 0.21]
PredReturn (%) 0.11 [−0.09, 0.31] 0.02 [−0.18, 0.23] 0.11 [−0.11, 0.32] 0.09 [−0.13, 0.31] 0.14 [−0.09, 0.37] 0.16 [−0.09, 0.41]
P2Retrun (%) −0.22 [−0.43, 0.01] −0.26** [−0.42, −0.12] −0.13 [−0.41, 0.16] 0.00 [−0.26, 0.28] 0.01 [−0.24, 0.29] 0.02 [−0.20, 0.28]
Table 2. Correlation coefficients and bootstrapped confidence intervals between PPI/SRP scores and behavioral 
responses (r values, 95% confidence intervals). *p < 0.05 level (2-tailed), **p < 0.01 level (2-tailed). CFGuilt: 
participants’ self-reported amount of counterfactual guilt they would have felt had they returned less money. 
PredInvest (%): the percentage of Player 1’s investment (multiplied by 4) that Player 2 believes Player 1 expects 
them to return. PredRetrun (%): the percentage of Player 1’s investment (multiplied by 4) that Player 2 believes 
the Player 1 expects them to return. P2Return (%): the percentage of Player 1’s investment (multiplied by 4) that 
Player 2 actually decides to return.
Behavior PPI
CFGuilt P2Return (%) Total Factor 1 Factor2
θ12 0.38** [0.15, 0.58] 0.72** [0.51, 0.86] −0.28* [−0.50, −0.03] −0.22 [−0.45, 0.03] −0.23 [−0.48, 0.04]
ϕ 0.27* [0.07, 0.45] 0.06 [−0.34, 0.46] −0.22 [−0.50, 0.11] −0.14 [−0.40, 0.14] −0.19 [−0.47, 0.12]
Table 3. Correlation coefficients (r) and 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals (between brackets) for the 
relationship between the computational parameters, behavioral measures and PPI scales. Note: *p < 0.05 level 
(2-tailed), **p < 0.01 level (2-tailed). CFGuil: participants’ self-reported the amount of counterfactual guilt they 
would have felt had they returned less money. P2Return (%): the percentage of Player 1’s investment (multiplied 
by 4) that Player 2 actually decided to return.
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Furthermore, the formal approach employed in our study provides significant advances as it allows us to dis-
entangle and quantify separate cognitive processes within a well-defined and validated mechanism describing the 
nature of their interactions during social decision-making.
One critical note is that we should remain cautious in extrapolating our results, obtained in a healthy sample, 
to incarcerated populations with severe levels of psychopathology. Nonetheless, as psychopathy has become more 
accepted as a constellation of personality traits, dimensional analyses with larger sample sizes would provide 
novel and valuable angles for further understanding the in-depth nature of psychopathy. Another point is that 
gender distribution was not optimal in our sample, though there is evidence showing that empathic processing 
and moral reasoning in fact do not differ between genders as a function of psychopathy scores in community 
samples45,46. This adds support to the validity of our results, but due to the novelty of our approach, it remains 
important to replicate our results in larger, gender-balanced, samples in the future.
A final issue is that our auxiliary measure of psychopathy (the SRP-SF) failed to yield any significant corre-
lations, and thus led to different results as compared to the PPI. This is in accordance with studies showing that 
the specific psychopathy instrument used has a large effect on the nature of both the significance and direction 
of the correlations. Across previous studies, the relationship between psychopathic traits and executive functions 
were divergent when assessing psychopathic traits using PCL-R and Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire 
(MPQ), that estimated the factors of psychopathy within a broad inventory of normal personality function-
ing31. Moreover, individuals with high psychopathic traits have also shown inconsistent results in executive and 
social functions27. One potential reason might be that different measures may be qualitatively and quantitatively 
non-comparable though assessing a similar factor of psychopathy. In our case, this lack of effect is not entirely 
unsurprising given that we oversampled the upper and lower extremes of the distribution of psychopathy scores 
based on the PPI total scores. While this approach helps to maximize the inclusion of relatively extreme PPI 
scores in the experimental sample, it does not lead to a similar effect for the distribution of the SRP-SF scores. 
Note also that the PPI and the SRP show strong differences in how they conceptualize and measure psychopathy, 
especially at the factor level47. Thus, it is likely that our oversampling procedure to maximize the tails of the PPI 
total score distribution had a suboptimal effect on the distribution of SRP (factor) scores. The distribution of 
the SRP-SF total score in our sample (see Supplementary Fig. S3) confirmed this explanation that most of our 
participants dropped to the lower SRP total score distribution. Moreover, the SRP-SF, derived from the PCL-R, 
has been examined, though in a limited way, in terms of the factor structure in community samples. However, 
findings have been inconsistent34,48. As compared to PPI, it is mainly used for estimating maladaptive behaviors 
among clinical psychopathy samples. Ongoing development of the SRP scale has involved adding a greater num-
ber of antisocial behavior items as compared to the PPI34. Our correlation results support the suggestion that SRP 
scores (both the total score and the two main factor scores) are correlated with the PPI-II rather than PPI-I. The 
PPI-I is the factor that represents the interpersonal (e.g., charm, grandiosity, and deceitfulness), and affective 
(e.g. lack of remorse, empathy, and emotional depth) traits of psychopathy, which reflect low guilt and deficient 
emotion processing49. In contrast, the PPI-II is the factor that captures the impulsive and chronic antisocial ten-
dencies associated with psychopathy, and is related to the inhibition control deficit. It is therefore reasonable that 
the PPI-I is more relevant to the current interpersonal decision-making context as compared to the PPI-II. Our 
results also support this idea in that a significant positive predictive effect was detected between the PPI-I score 
and the subsequent reciprocal decision-making (see Results), but a similar effect was not found with the PPI-II.
In conclusion, the present study showed that individuals scoring high on psychopathic traits are able to accu-
rately infer the social expectations of others when making monetary choices in a social context, but that they are 
still more prone to demonstrate selfish, less-reciprocal, decision-making. In our study, two separate measures of 
participants’ guilt sensitivity were used; self-reported counterfactual guilt and a computational parameter cap-
turing guilt sensitivity for each participant. Across both measures, we found that the higher people scored on PPI 
total scores, the lower their guilt aversion. These results support the hypothesis that an attenuated sensitivity to 
social emotions (in this case anticipated guilt) among individuals scoring high on psychopathy is related to indif-
ference to others’ welfare and profit, and leads them to ignore social expectations. That is, we propose that indi-
viduals with high levels of psychopathic traits have the ability to understand social expectations, but down-weight 
this information when making social decisions50–52.
Methods
Participants. Sixty-six participants were recruited via two different rounds at Radboud University, the 
Netherlands (see Supplement). They received either monetary compensation (16 Euros) or course credit (3 points) 
for completing the task. Additionally, participants had the opportunity to receive a monetary bonus dependent 
on task performance (maximum of 10 Euros). The study ethical approval has been granted by the ethical commit-
tee of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the Radboud University (ECG2012-1304-025). All participants provided 
written informed consent in accordance Declaration of Helsinki and the guidelines of the local ethics committee.
Three participants were excluded from the statistical analyses; two did not finish the experiment in time, and 
the third because they did not complete the PPI and SRP questionnaires. Therefore, analyses were performed on 
63 participants (50 females), with age ranging from 18 to 40 (M = 22.28, SD = 4.03). For an additional check of 
gender-dependent distribution of scores, a two-sample t-test was performed between the female and male group 
for all the PPI/SRP total and subscales (see Table 1).
Measures of psychopathy-related traits. The Dutch translation of the PPI was used as the primary 
measure of psychopathy10,53. The PPI is a comprehensive self-report instrument that estimates psychopathic per-
sonality characteristics in non-clinical samples. The PPI consists of 187 items, measuring traits on 8 subscales 
that represent different general personality traits. Each item is evaluated on a 4-point Likert-scale, ranging from 
1 (false) to 4 (true). Higher PPI total scores correspond to higher degrees of psychopathy. Factor analyses have 
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found that the scales of the PPI load on super-ordinate factors, known as the PPI-I (Fearless Dominance) and the 
PPI-II (Antisocial impulsivity)49. Three subscales, namely Social Potency, Fearlessness, and Stress Immunity, are 
clustered into the PPI-I Factor; while four other subscales - Machiavellian Egocentricity, Blame Externalisation, 
Carefree Non-planfulness, and Impulsive Nonconformity - comprise the PPI-II Factor. A third factor consists of 
the subscale Coldheartedness. The total PPI score is usually regarded as a global index of the psychopathy, with 
strong internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha 0.89)54. PPI factor scores were calculated by first normalizing to raw 
scores (z-transformation) based on the total experimental sample size and summing the relevant scales to create 
the PPI-I and PPI-II factors, respectively.
The Dutch version of Hare’s Self-Report Psychopathy scale was used as an additional measure to assess 
psychopathy-related traits55. The SRP-SF is directly derived from the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R)33, 
a semi-structured clinical interview that is considered to be the golden standard for assessing psychopathy. The 
SRP-SF differs from the PPI in that it measures maladaptive behaviors and traits instead of general personality 
traits. The SRP-SF consists of 29 items that measure 4 facets of psychopathy; Interpersonal (Facet 1) and affective 
disturbances (Facet 2), antisociality (Facet 3), and deviant lifestyle (Facet 4). Facets 1 and 2 can be clustered into a 
higher-order factor measuring interpersonal-affective impairments (SRP-F1) and facets 3 and 4 can be combined 
into an antisocial-lifestyle factor (SRP-F2). The two-factor model has been the most prominent in the literature. 
The SRP-SF has good psychometric properties (Cronbach’s alpha 0.84)55.
Experimental task. A modified version of the Trust Game was used28. The game is played by two players, 
with Player 1 being the ‘investor’ and Player 2 the ‘trustee’. Player 1 is first endowed with a sum of money by the 
experimenter (€10 in our experiment). Player 1 then decides the amount of money he/she wants to invest with 
Player 2, in 1 Euro increments ranging from zero to the entire endowment. Once an amount has been selected 
by Player 1, this is multiplied by 4, and this new amount (i.e., the total investment) is transferred to Player 2. 
Importantly, both players know in advance about the multiplier. Following the transfer, Player 2 has the opportu-
nity to return some of this transferred money back to the Investor, but is not obliged to. The amount that Player 
2 decides to return to Player 1 was our primary behavioral index in this game. In each round, Player 2 was also 
asked to estimate how much he/she believed that Player 1 would invest and how much he/she believed Player 1 
expected in return (Fig. 1). All participants played in the role of Player 2.
After participants had completed the experiment, they were sequentially shown the outcomes of the 30 rounds 
with all Player 1’s and were asked to rate their counterfactual guilt on a 7-point Likert scale (scaled 1–7, with 1 
indicating not feeling any guilt, 4 indicating moderate guilt, and 7 indicating feeling extremely guilty), on which 
they could indicate the amount of guilt they believed they would have experienced if they had returned a different 
amount of money. This ‘counterfactual’ amount was randomly selected from all choices lower than the amount 
they had returned and one choice higher than the amount they had returned (choices increased or decreased by 
10% increments). Finally, all participants were paid a bonus based on their decisions in one randomly selected 
round.
Guilt aversion model. We fit the data with an adapted guilt aversion model28 to estimate individuals’ guilt 
sensitivity. This model proposes that the utility of Player 2 in the Trust Game could be divided into two parts: 
financial utility (M2) and the anticipated experience of guilt (or guilt utility). A rational Player 2 is interested 
in balancing both parts through maximising monetary income and minimising anticipated guilt. In our task, 
anticipated guilt can be considered as the non-negative difference between the amount of money Player 1 expects 
Player 2 to return (E1S2) and the amount of money Player 2 actually returns (S2). Since Player 2 does not know the 
amount Player 1 expects them to return (1st order belief), the model uses Player 2’s belief of Player 1’s expectation 
(2nd order belief: E2E1S2) as a substitute input.
The mathematical derivation of these parameters is described in equation (1). Player 2’s total utility in trial i 
is U2i, which can be defined as
θ θ= − − − +U M E E S S(1 ) ( ) (1)i i2 12 2 12 2 1 2 2
According to the above model, the relative weight placed on the financial payoff (M2) and the anticipated guilt 
(E2E1S2 − S2)+ in the utility function is modulated by a guilt sensitivity parameter (θ12), which can vary for each 
Player 1 that Player 2 meets. This guilt sensitivity term is scaled by a free parameter, constrained in the range of 
( θ< <0 112 ). The θ12 (guilt sensitivity) parameter quantifies how sensitive participants are to the experience of 
guilt if they let their partner down. For example, if θ12 = 0, they are completely self-interested, demonstrating 
insensitivity to guilt; while if θ12 = 1, they are very sensitive to anticipated guilt. We theorize that balancing the 
weights of both financial income (self-interest) and Player 2’s (2nd order belief) plays a decisive role in guiding 
decisions in the Trust Game.
Choice rule. We extended the above model to allow for stochasticity (i.e., randomness) by applying a proba-
bilistic choice function. A free parameter ϕ was used to capture the stochasticity in the action selection. The 
probability Pi of making a decision i was computed by placing the utility values for each decision into the follow-
ing softmax function.
=
∑
ϕ
ϕ
=
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in which Pi denotes the probability that in trial i Player 2 chooses k (with k standing for the maximum amount of 
money in that trial they could return) to return to Player 1. The free parameter ϕi is used to capture the sensitivi-
ties of choice i to different utilities. If ϕi = 0, choices are random, while if ϕi = Infinity, the utility is maximised. In 
the guilt aversion model (Equation 1), the total utility is comprised of both the participants’ income (M2) and the 
weighted anticipation of guilt (E2E1S2 − S2)+. The model of guilt sensitivity included a stochastic of the choice 
sensitivity parameter ϕ, in which both parameters were estimated using maximum likelihood estimators (for 
details see Supplement).
General analyses. Frequency distributions of the following variables across all trials over all participants 
are shown in Fig. 2: (A) Player 1’s Investment; (B) The percentage of Player 1’s investment (multiplied by 4) 
that participants expected Player 2 to return (1st Order Belief: E1S2); (C) The percentage of Player 1’s invest-
ment (multiplied by 4) that Player 2 believed Player 1 had expected them to return (Player 2’s 2nd Order Belief: 
E2E1S2); (D) The percentage of Player 1’s investment (multiplied by 4) that Player 2 actually decided to return 
(S2); Furthermore, mixed model regressions (see Supplement) were implemented between (A) Player 1’s 1st Order 
belief and Player 2’s 2nd Order belief. Significant effects here would indicate that participants were capable of 
accurately inferring other players’ expectations; (B) Player 2’s 2nd Order belief and the amount of money they 
returned. Significant effects here would illustrate that participants’ behavioral patterns are inconsistent with a 
guilt aversion model to a certain extent. In addition, for each participant, mixed effect regression was used to 
predict the amount of counterfactual guilt reported if they returned a different amount of money. According to 
the guilt aversion model, the deviation between the participants’ actual repayment and their belief about Player 1’s 
expectation indexed anticipated guilt. Thus, each participant’s best linear unbiased predictions (BLUPs) demon-
strate their sensitivity to guilt. The group BLUP was computed based on individual scores. Larger slopes indicated 
higher guilt sensitivity.
Analyses of relationships with psychopathy traits. To understand the relationships between psycho-
pathic traits as well as the participants’ utilitarian behaviors, Pearson correlations were computed between the 
global indexes of PPI/SRP scores (the total as well as the two main factor scores) and participants’ behavioral 
responses (counterfactual guilt and amount of money actually returned) (Table 2 and Fig. 4). Because the SRP 
measures correlated factors known to have suppression effects56, we also ran partial correlation analyses to con-
trol for the shared variance between the factors. The significance of the Pearson correlations was tested with a 
bootstrapping procedure to determine the 95% confidence interval (CI). The same procedure was used to obtain 
Pearson correlations for the relationship between the two estimated free parameters θ12 and ϕ, the participants’ 
behavioral responses, and the total and factor scores of the PPI and the SRP, respectively57.
Data Availability
The datasets generated during and/or analysed during the current study are available from the corresponding 
author on reasonable request.
Figure 4. Pearson correlation between scores on PPI/SRP and behavioural performance. (A) Scatterplot for 
Pearson correlations between total PPI score and participants’ reported counterfactual guilt. (B) Scatter plot 
for Pearson correlations between PPI Factor 1 score and the percentage of the total investment that Player 2 
returned.
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